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ABSTRACT
It has been argued that security perspectives, of which ac-
cess control is one, should be taken into account as early
as possible in the software development process. Towards
that goal, we present in this paper a tool supporting our
modelling approach to specify and verify access control in
accordance to the NIST standard Role-Based Access Con-
trol (RBAC). RBAC is centred on mapping users to their
roles in an organisation, to make access control permissions
easier to set and maintain.
Our modelling approach uses only standard UML mecha-
nisms, like metamodels and OCL constraints, and improves
on existing approaches in various ways: designers don't have
to learn new languages or adopt new tools or methodolo-
gies; user-role and role-permission assignments can be spec-
ied separately to be reused across models; access control is
specied over class and activity diagrams, including `anti-
scenarios'; access control is automatically veried. The tool
is built on top of an existing modelling IDE and allows for
automatic verication of models according to our RBAC
modelling approach, while providing users with the ability
to easily identify and correct errors in the model when they
are detected.
Categories and Subject Descriptors: D.2.2 [Software
Engineering]: Design Tools and Techniques | Computer-
Aided Software Engineering
General Terms: Security, Verication.
Keywords: Security, UML, RBAC, model, verication, OCL,
Model-Driven Engineering.
1. INTRODUCTION
Security is a growing concern in the software engineering
community [8]. As software systems are increasingly con-
nected and handle more and more sensitive data, making
sure that access is restricted to only those who are autho-
rised becomes a crucial concern. Giving users access to too
much data or processes will increase the risk of misuse, while
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not giving users the permissions they actually need will pre-
vent them from getting their work done.
Too often is security dealt with at the end of a software de-
velopment project, leading to ill-designed systems with poor
protection of data and other assets. As Fernandez-Medina
et al. point out [4], security would greatly benet from be-
ing taken into account as early as possible in the software
development process, for example as part of a Model-Driven
Engineering process. This would make it easier to: keep
track of security requirements and to make sure that the
security measures that have been selected actually enforce
those requirements; handle change and its impact on secu-
rity; communicate the security measures to the stakeholders
who do not have a computer science background and are not
able or not willing to read code.
This paper presents tool support for modelling RBAC con-
gurations and properties on several UML diagrams, and for
verifying that the model actually does enforce those access
control properties. The tool is a part of a modelling IDE,
allowing users to use it in a familiar environment, together
with their usual modelling activities.
The paper is organised as follows: we present background
and related work in Section 2, then introduce the tool and
the approach it supports in Section 3. We discuss future
work in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present the RBAC standard, as well as
existing Model-Driven Security approaches.
2.1 RBAC
RBAC is an access control model that has been standard-
ised by the NIST [9]. The main idea behind RBAC is to
map users to roles and roles to permissions, instead of map-
ping users to permissions directly. Roles are supposed to
match the users' actual roles in an organisation. Since roles,
and not users, are assigned permissions, it makes access con-
trol conguration easier to maintain within an organisation:
when a new person joins, the administrator only has to as-
sign her to the roles she needs to get her work done. If
that person's responsibilities within the organisation change
later, then it's just a matter of adding and/or removing
roles. If a role's responsibilities change, then changing the
role's permissions accordingly will be reected in what all
the users assigned to that role can and cannot do.
The RBAC standard is divided in four dierent levels,
each level adding new functionalities on top of the previ-
ous one. Level 0 denes user-role assignments as well as
Level Features
0 users, roles, permissions
1 role hierarchies
2 constraints (Separation of Duty)
3 review
Table 1: RBAC features for each level
role-permission assignments. Each user can be assigned any
number of roles, and each role can be assigned any num-
ber of permissions. Level 1 adds role hierarchies: these are
partial orders in which roles can inherit other roles' per-
missions. Level 1a, also called General Hierarchical RBAC,
supports arbitrary partial orders, while level 1b, also called
Limited Hierarchical RBAC, comes with limited partial or-
ders. The limitation depends on the vendor's choice. Next,
level 2 adds Separation of Duty (SoD) constraints: to pre-
vent conicts of interest, it is possible to forbid a user to be
granted two roles at the same time. This enforcement can
be done either at the user-role assignment level, using static
constraints, or within a session, using dynamic constraints.
Finally, level 3 adds a permission-role assignment review re-
quirement: it must be possible to review which roles are
assigned to a specic permission, and which permissions are
assigned to a specic role. Table 2.1 summarises each level's
requirements.
2.2 Model-Driven Engineering
Model-Driven Engineering (MDE) is the software engi-
neering approach that is built around the principle that ev-
erything is a model. Models are dened according to a meta-
model, but the growing number of metamodels led to an-
other higher level to describe metamodels: meta-metamodels
[3]. Several organisations and companies propose platforms
to support MDE. One of them, arguably the most widely
used, is the OMG's Model-Driven Architecture approach
[10], which includes UML (Unied Modeling Language) mod-
els, OCL (Object Constraint Language) constraints and MOF
(Meta-Object Facility) metamodels and meta-metamodels.
In the security world, Fernandez-Medina et al. point out
that \current approaches which take security into consider-
ation from the early stages of software development do not
take advantage of Model-Driven Development"[4], but it is a
direction that is being developed, including by Basin et al.
[2], who dene Model-Driven Security (MDS) as a specialisa-
tion of MDE, where \a designer builds a system model along
with security requirements, and automatically generates from
this a complete, congured security infrastructure".
2.3 Modelling RBAC properties on UML
Several approaches exist for modelling RBAC properties
on UML. UMLsec [6] uses UML's extension mechanisms to
express security properties. It is not limited to access con-
trol, but its support of RBAC is limited, as it does not sup-
port all the levels of the standard. RBAC properties can
be dened on activity diagrams only. Tool support exists to
verify models against the RBAC properties.
Another approach, SecureUML [7], uses class diagrams in-
stead of activity diagrams to express access control congu-
rations and properties. Classes are used to model users and
roles, and association classes give permissions. SecureUML
can also generate EJB code enforcing the RBAC properties.
Finally, authUML [1] allows one to dene RBAC prop-
erties on use case diagrams, which are usually used early
in the development cycle. authUML modelling is done in
three consecutive steps: rst, dening and processing access
control requirements, by transforming the requirements into
predicates; second, ensuring consistency, completeness and
conict-free accesses of Use Cases; third, ensuring consis-
tency, completeness and conict-free accesses for operations.
We are not aware of any tool support for authUML.
3. OUR APPROACH
Our approach diers from the other ones in that it al-
lows one to model RBAC congurations and properties on
several UML diagrams. We use the standard UML exten-
sion mechanisms to provide extra annotation capabilities to
existing UML diagrams: class diagrams, activity diagrams,
and access control diagrams, that are a custom version of
class diagrams to model users, roles, permissions, and their
assignments.
It is also dierent from other approaches by including anti-
scenarios: while other approaches focus only on verifying
that a specic user has access to a specic resource, we also
allow one to model anti-scenarios, where a specic user must
not have access to a specic resource.
3.1 RBAC profile
The access control conguration can be seen on the ac-
cess control diagram: users, roles and permissions are repre-
sented using stereotyped classes. Associations between users
and roles and between roles and permissions are the assign-
ments. The entire RBAC standard is supported: role hi-
erarchies can be represented using class generalisation, and
SoD constraints can be expressed using OCL constraints.
The class diagram allows one to stereotype operations
whose access should be restricted. These stereotypes must
come with at least one association to a permission in the
access control diagram. The set of associations represents
the permissions needed to perform the operation.
Finally, the activity diagram is the place where the access
control properties are dened: stereotyped partitions repre-
sent users, and those stereotypes must come with an associ-
ation with a user in the access control diagram. Stereotyped
partitions also come with associations to roles: these are the
roles that the user represented by the partition has activated
before the activity starts. This set of roles must necessarily
be a subset of the roles assigned to the user. Then, actions in
the diagram can also be stereotyped. An action that a user
needs to be able to perform is stereotyped with «granted»,
while an anti-scenario, i.e. an action that a user can never
be able to perform is stereotyped with «forbidden». Both
these stereotypes come with associations to operations in
the class diagram, that describe the operations involved in
the action. Actions can also be stereotyped with «acti-
vateRoles» (resp. «deactivateRoles») to express that a
set of roles is activated (resp. deactivated) before the ac-
tion starts, and deactivated (resp. re-activated) right after
it nishes.
Figure 1 is a sample model annotated using our approach.
It represents a system allowing professors and teaching assis-
tants to ll a database with students' marks. The students
are only able to read their marks. There is a hierarchy rela-
tionship between professors and teaching assistants so that
users assigned with the Professor role inherit from the per-
missions assigned to the Teaching Assistant role. The model
is made of one access control diagram, one class diagram and
one activity diagram. In the activity diagram, the user Doe
starts the activity with no role activated, and activates the
Student role to perform an action. This is to demonstrate
the possibility to activate roles for a specic action. Associ-
ations between stereotypes are normally not visible on the
diagrams, but we have represented them as notes for the
reader's convenience.
3.2 Consistency
Because we use several types of diagrams, it is essential
to ensure that they do not contradict each other. To en-
force consistency between diagrams, we have dened a set
of 20 OCL constraints. For example, one of them makes
sure that an action stereotyped with «granted» is not also
stereotyped with «forbidden»: it would not make sense to
have an action that a user must at the same time always be
able to perform and never be able to perform.
SoD constraints can be added by the user to the prole.
While static SoD ensures that the same user can not be
assigned both of two roles, dynamic SoD only enforces that
these two roles can not be activated in the same time. Static
SoD is veried on the access control diagram, by checking
the user-role assignments while taking role hierarchies into
account. Dynamic SoD is veried on activity diagrams, by
making sure that the two conicting roles are not activated
in the same time on a single action.
3.3 Verification
The verication of RBAC properties is done using two
similar OCL contraints: one for actions stereotyped with
«granted», and another one for actions stereotyped with
«forbidden». In both cases, we compute two sets: the set
Permneeded of permissions required for the action to be per-
formed, and the set Permactivated of permissions that the
user has activated when s/he tries to perform the action. For
actions stereotyped with «granted», the verication suc-
ceedes if the user has activated at least all the permissions
required, i.e. if Permneeded  Permactivated. For actions
stereotyped with «forbidden», the verications suceeds if
the user has not activated all the required permissions, i.e.
if Permneeded 6 Permactivated.
3.4 Implementation
Our approach has been implemented as a UML prole for
IBM Rational Software Architect [5]. The prole, together
with a few sample models, are available online1.
During the modelling process, the model will go through
stages where it violates one or several constraints. Live eval-
uation, i.e. evaluation of the constraints every time a change
is performed to the model, is therefore not suitable for this
approach, as it would trigger a lot of unnecessary errors.
The OCL constraints are therefore veried in batch mode.
The tool then issues errors and warning that indicate which
OCL constraint has been violated and where, both in the
console and in the diagram, as one can see in Figure 2. The
verication of the example in Figure 1 takes about 3 seconds
on a computer with a 2.53GHz Intel i5 M 460 CPU and 4GB
of RAM, using Rational Software Architect version 8.0.1
Our RBAC prole can simply be added to an existing
modelling project, and it is possible to use it immediately.
1http://computing-research.open.ac.uk/rbac
Figure 1: A sample model of a students' mark sys-
tem
Figure 2: Screenshot of the tool showing errors in the model
The OCL validation command will then verify the annotated
model against the RBAC properties specied on the activity
diagrams. If errors are found, they are reported both on the
graphical representation of the model and in an error mes-
sage. The combination of both notications makes it easy to
identify where a problem lies, and what constraint the model
violates. The tool stays out of the way of the user, allowing
her to proceed with her modelling activities, especially those
not directly related to access control concerns.
4. FUTUREWORK
Future releases of the software will extend the metamodel
and support model evolution.
The extension of our approach's metamodel will allow us
to support more UML diagrams, such as sequence diagrams.
Each type of diagram provides a dierent view on the soft-
ware, and it is important to be able to represent access con-
trol in each of the views in which it makes sense to do so.
Software evolution is the other direction we will follow to
improve our tool, both for step-by-step evolution and for
software merging. After a sequence of changes, only the
OCL rules whose evaluation may have been impacted should
be re-checked. Repair actions will then be suggested when
a model is found insecure, in order to x it.
Merge situations typically arise when two organisations
become one. They will eventually have to merge their ac-
cess control congurations and properties. We will provide
support to help users during the merge operations, by de-
tecting potential conicts as well as similar elements that
might be merged, and by providing repair actions to make
the resulting model satisfy the merged properties.
5. CONCLUSION
We presented a UML prole for Rational Software Ar-
chitect that allows one to model RBAC congurations and
properties on a UML model, using three dierent types of
diagrams. The prole contains OCL constraints that en-
sure that the RBAC-related annotations are consistent, and
will raise both textual and visual errors when they are vi-
olated. OCL constraints can also be used to enforce static
and dynamic SoD constraints. The verication of the RBAC
properties expressed on activity diagrams is performed with
two OCL constraints that make use of the annotations in
the three supported types of diagrams to make sure that
the annotated model does enforce the properties expressed.
Although the prole has been developed for use with Ratio-
nal Software Architect, the fact that we only use standard
technologies makes it easy to port to other modelling IDEs
that support modelling of UML models, extensions of the
UML metamodel, and verication of OCL constraints.
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